Deep neural networks (DNNs) have become popular for medical image analysis tasks like cancer diagnosis and lesion detection. However, a recent study demonstrates that medical deep learning systems can be compromised by carefullyengineered adversarial examples/attacks, i.e., small imperceptible perturbations can fool DNNs to predict incorrectly. This raises safety concerns about the deployment of deep learning systems in clinical settings. In this paper, we provide a deeper understanding of adversarial examples in the context of medical images. We find that medical DNN models can be more vulnerable to adversarial attacks compared to natural ones from three different viewpoints: 1) medical image DNNs that have only a few classes are generally easier to be attacked; 2) the complex biological textures of medical images may lead to more vulnerable regions; and most importantly, 3) state-of-the-art deep networks designed for large-scale natural image processing can be overparameterized for medical imaging tasks and result in high vulnerability to adversarial attacks. Surprisingly, we also find that medical adversarial attacks can be easily detected, i.e., simple detectors can achieve over 98% detection AUCs against state-of-the-art attacks, due to their fundamental feature difference from normal examples. We show this is because adversarial attacks tend to attack a wide spread area outside the pathological regions, which results in deep features that are fundamentally different and easily separable from normal features. We believe these findings may be a useful basis to approach the design of secure medical deep learning systems.
Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are powerful models that have been widely used to achieve near human-level performance on a variety of natural image analysis tasks such as image classification (He et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2017; Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Szegedy et al., 2015) , object detection (Ren et al., 2015; He et al., 2017a; Redmon et al., 2016) , and image segmentation (Badrinarayanan et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017; Noh et al., 2015) . Driven by their current success on natural images, DNNs have become a popular tool for medical image processing tasks, such as cancer diagnosis (Cireşan et al., 2013; Esteva et al., 2017) , diabetic retinopathy detection (Kaggle, 2015) and organ/landmark localization (Roth et al., 2015) . Despite their superior performance, recent studies have found that state-of-the-art DNNs are vulnerable to carefully crafted adversarial examples (or attacks), i.e., slightly perturbed input instances can fool DNNs into making incorrect predictions with high confidence (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2017b; Madry et al., 2018b; Ma et al., 2018; Athalye et al., 2018) . This has raised safety concerns about the deployment of deep learning models in safety-critical applications such as face recognition (Sharif et al., 2016) , autonomous driving (Evtimov et al., 2017) , and medical diagnosis (Finlayson et al., 2019) .
While existing works on adversarial machine learning research have mostly focused on natural images, a full understanding of adversarial attacks in the medical image domain is still open. Medical images can have domain-specific characteristics that are quite different from natural images, for example, unique biological textures. A recent work has confirmed that medical deep learning systems can also be compromised by adversarial attacks (Finlayson et al., 2019) . As shown in Figure 1 , across three medical image datasets Fundoscopy (Food et al., 2018; Kaggle, 2015) , Chest X-Ray (Wang et al., 2017) and Dermoscopy (ISIC, 2019) , diagnosis results can be arbitrarily manipulated by adversarial attacks. Considering the vast sums of money which underpin the healthcare economy, this inevitably creates risks whereby potential attackers may seek to profit from manipulation against the healthcare system. For example, an attacker might manipulate their examination reports to commit inarXiv:1907.10456v1 [cs.CV] 24 Jul 2019 surance fraud or a false claim of medical reimbursement (Paschali et al., 2018) . On the other hand, an attacker might seek to cause disruption by imperceptibly manipulating an image to cause a misdiagnosis of disease. This could have severe impact for decisions made about a patient. As deep learning models and medical imaging techniques become increasingly used in the process of medical diagnostics, decision support and pharmaceutical approvals (Pien et al., 2005) , secure and robust medical deep learning systems become crucial (Finlayson et al., 2019; Paschali et al., 2018) . A first and important step is to develop a comprehensive understanding of adversarial attacks in this domain.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive understanding of medical image adversarial attacks from the perspective of generating as well as detecting these attacks. Two recent works (Finlayson et al., 2019; Paschali et al., 2018) have investigated adversarial attacks on medical images and mainly focused on testing the robustness of deep models designed for medical image analysis. In particular, the work of (Paschali et al., 2018) tested whether existing medical deep learning models can be attacked by adversarial attacks. They showed that classification accuracy drops from above 87% on normal medical images to almost 0% on adversarial examples. Work in (Paschali et al., 2018) utilized adversarial examples as a measure to evaluate the robustness of medical imaging models in classification or segmentation tasks. Their study was restricted to small perturbations and they observed a marginal but variable performance drop across different models. Despite these studies, the following question has remained open "Can adversarial attacks on medical images be crafted as easily as attacks on natural images? If not, why?". Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no previous work has investigated the detection of medical image adversarial examples. A natural question here is to ask "To what degree are adversarial attacks on medical images detectable?. In this paper, we provide some answers to these questions by investigating both the crafting (generation) and detection of adversarial attacks on medical images.
In summary, our main contributions are:
1. We find that adversarial attacks on medical images can succeed more easily than those on natural images. That is, less perturbation is required to craft a successful attack.
2. We show the higher vulnerability of medical image DNNs appears to be due to several reasons: 1) medical image classification generally involves a fewer number of classes, reducing the difficulty of attack; 2) some medical images have complex biological textures, leading to more high gradient regions that are sensitive to small adversarial perturbations; and most importantly,
3) state-of-the-art DNNs designed for large-scale natural image processing can be overparameterized for medical imaging tasks, resulting in a sharp loss landscape and high vulnerability to adversarial attacks.
3. We show that surprisingly, medical image adversarial attacks can also be easily detected. A simple detector trained on deep features alone can achieve over 98% detection AUC against all tested attacks across our three datasets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on the detection of adversarial attacks in the medical image domain.
4. We show that the high detectability of medical image adversarial examples appears to be because adversarial attacks result in perturbations to widespread regions outside the lesion area. This results in deep feature values for adversarial examples that are recognizably different from those of normal examples.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly introduce deep learning based medical image analysis. In section 3, we provide an introduction to adversarial attack and defense techniques. We conduct systematic experiments in sections 4 & 5 to investigate and understand the behaviour of medical image adversarial attacks. Section 6 discusses several future work and summarizes our contributions.
Background of Medical Image Analysis
Driven by the current success of deep learning in traditional computer vision, the field of medical imaging analysis (MIA) has also been influenced by DNN models. One of the first contributions of DNNs was in the area of medical image classification. This includes several highly successful applications of DNNs in medical diagnosis, such as the severity stage of diabetic retinopathy from retinal fundoscopy (Kaggle, 2015) , lung diseases from chest x-ray (Wang et al., 2017) or skin cancer from dermoscopic photographs (ISIC, 2019) . Another important application of DNNs in medical image analysis is the segmentation of organs or lesions. Organ segmentation aims to quantitatively measure the organs, such as vessels (Gu & Cheng, 2015) and kidneys (Wang et al., 2019b) , as a prelude to diagnosis or radiology therapy. It also helps locating equipment in robotic surgery (Zhou et al., 2019) . U-Net (Ronneberger et al., 2015) is one of these specialized DNN models for medical image segmentation. Registration is another important task in medical imaging, where the objective is to spatially align medical images from different modalities or capture settings. For example, exploited the local similarity between CT and MRI images with two types of auto-encoders. (Food et al., 2018; Kaggle, 2015) (first row, DR=diabetic retinopathy), Chest X-Ray (Wang et al., 2017) Deep learning based medical image analysis may operate on a variety of input image sources, such as visible light images, hyperspectral light images, X-rays and nuclear magnetic resonance images, across various anatomical areas such as the brain, chest, skin and retina. Brain images have been extensively studied to diagnose Alzheimers disease (Liu et al., 2014) , Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (Heinsfeld et al., 2018) , tumor segmentation (Menze et al., 2015) , and perform lacunes segmentation (Maier et al., 2017) . Ophthalmic imaging is another important application, which mainly focuses either on color fundus imaging (CFI) or Optical coherence tomography (OCT) for eye disease diagnosis or abnormalities segmentation. Among these applications, the deep learning based diabetic retinopathy diagnosis system was the first that was approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Food et al., 2018) . (Gulshan et al., 2016a) achieved comparable accuracy in detecting diabetic retinopathy to seven certified ophthalmologists using an Inception network. There are systems that apply either a 2D Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) (Setio et al., 2016) or 3D CNN (Dou et al., 2017) to extract deep features to detect and classify nodules (Wang et al., 2017) in the chest from radiography and computed tomography (CT) (Wang et al., 2017) . Digital pathology and microscopy is also a popular task due to the heavy burden on clinicians analyzing large numbers of histopathology images of tissue specimens. Specifically, this task involves segmenting high density cells and classifying the mitoses (Ciresan et al., 2013) . The above studies rely on the images captured by specialized cameras or devices. In contrast, in the context of skin cancer, it has been shown that standard cameras can deliver excellent performance as input to DNN models (Esteva et al., 2017) .
Inspired by this success, the International Skin Imaging Collaboration (ISIC, 2019) released a large dataset to support research on melanoma early detection.
Most of these methods, especially diagnosis ones, adopt roughly the same pipeline, on a variety of images including ophthalmology (Kaggle, 2015) , radiology (Wang et al., 2017) and dermatology (ISIC, 2019) . The images are input into CNNs (typically the most advanced ones existing at the time, such as 'AlexNet', 'VGG', 'Inception' and 'ResNet' (He et al., 2016) ) to learn intermediate medical features before generating the final output. Whilst these pipelines have achieved excellent success, similar to those for standard computer vision object recognition, they have been criticized for having a lack of transparency. Due to the black-box nature of CNNs, humans find it difficult to verify the system's reasoning, which is essential for clinical applications which require high levels of trust. It is easy to see that such trust may be further eroded by the existence of adversarial examples, whereby an imperceptible modification may result in costly and sometimes irreparable damage. We next discuss methods for adversarial attack and detection.
Preliminaries
In this paper, we focus on medical image classification tasks using DNNs. For a K-class (K ≥ 2) classification problem, given a dataset {(x i , y i )} i=1,...,N with x i ∈ R d as a normal example and y i ∈ {1, . . . , K} as its associated label, a DNN classifier h with parameter θ predicts the class of an input
where z k (x i , θ) is the logits output of the network with respect to class k, and p k (x i , θ) is the probability (softmax on logits) of x i belonging to class k. The model parameters θ are updated using back-propagation to minimize the classification loss such as the commonly used cross entropy
3.1. Adversarial Attacks.
Given a pretrained DNN model h and a normal sample x with class label y, an attacking method is to maximize the classification error of the DNN model, whilst keeping x adv within a small -ball centered at the original sample
with L ∞ being the most commonly used norm due to its consistency with respect to human perception (Madry et al., 2018a) . Adversarial attacks can be either targeted or untargeted. A targeted attack is to find an adversarial example x adv that can be predicted by the DNN to a target class (h(x adv ) = y target ) which is different from the true class (y target = y), while an untargeted attack is to find an adversarial example x adv that can be misclassified to an arbitrary class (h(x adv ) = y). Adversarial attacks can be generated either in a white-box setting using adversarial gradients extracted directly from the target model, or a black-box setting by attacking a surrogate model or estimation of the adversarial gradients. In this paper, we focus on targeted attacks in the white-box setting under the L ∞ perturbation constraint.
For white-box targeted attacks, adversarial examples can be generated by solving the following constrained optimization problem:
where (·) is the classification loss, and y target = y is the target class. A wide range of attacking methods have been proposed for the crafting of adversarial examples. Here, we introduce a selection of the most representative and state-ofthe-art attacks.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). FGSM perturbs normal examples x for one step by the amount of along the input gradient direction (Goodfellow et al., 2014 ):
Basic Iterative Method (BIM). BIM is an iterative version of FGSM. Different to FGSM, BIM iteratively perturbs the input with smaller step size,
where α is the step size, and x t is the adversarial example at the t-th step (x 0 = x). The step size is set to α = /T for overall T steps of perturbation.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). PGD perturbs a normal example x for a number of T steps with smaller step size. After each step of perturbation, PGD projects the adversarial example back onto the -ball of x, if it goes beyond (Madry et al., 2018a ):
where α is the step size, Π(·) is the projection function, and x t is the adversarial example at the t-th step (x 0 = x). Different from BIM, PGD allows αT > , and uses random start for
is the uniform distribution between − and , and of the same d dimensions as x. PGD is regarded as the strongest first-order attack.
Carlini and Wagner (CW) Attack. The CW attack is a state-of-the-art optimization-based attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b ). There are two versions of the CW attack: L 2 and L ∞ , here we focus on the L ∞ version. According to (Madry et al., 2018b) , the L ∞ version of targeted CW attack can be solved by the PGD algorithm iteratively as following
wheref (·) is the surrogate loss for the constrained optimization problem defined in Eq. (3), z y is the logits with respect to class y, and κ is a parameter controls the confidence of the attack.
There are also other types of attacking methods, such as the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) (Papernot et al., 2016a) , one pixel attack (Su et al., 2019) , adversarial patch (Brown et al., 2017) , DeepFool attack (MoosaviDezfooli et al., 2016) and elastic attack . In this paper, we focus on the four state-of-the-art attacks mentioned above: FGSM, BIM, PGD and CW.
Adversarial Detection
A number of defense models have been developed, including defensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2016b) , feature analysis (Xu et al., 2017; Ma et al., 2018) , input denoising (Guo et al., 2018; Liao et al., 2018; Samangouei et al., 2018) , gradient regularization (Gu & Rigazio, 2014; Papernot et al., 2017; Tramèr et al., 2018; Ross & Doshi-Velez, 2018) , model compression (Liu et al., 2018; Das et al., 2018; Rakin et al., 2018) and adversarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Nøkland, 2015; Madry et al., 2018a) . However, these defenses can generally be evaded by the latest attacks, either wholly or partially (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; He et al., 2017b; Li & Vorobeychik, 2014; .
Given the inherent challenges for adversarial defense, recent works have instead focused on detecting adversarial examples. These works attempt to discriminate adversarial examples (positive class) from normal examples (negative class), based on features extracted from different layers of a DNN. Detection subnetworks based on activations (Metzen et al., 2017) , a cascade detector based on the PCA projection of activations (Li & Li, 2016) , an augmented neural network detector based on statistical measures (Grosse et al., 2017) , a learning framework that covers unexplored space in vulnerable models (Rouhani et al., 2017; , a logistic regression detector based on KD features (Feinman et al., 2017) and the Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID) of adversarial subspaces (Ma et al., 2018) are a few such works.
Kernel Density (KD): KD assumes that normal samples from the same class lie densely on the data manifold while adversarial samples lie in more sparse regions off the data submanifold. Given a point x of class k, and a set of training samples from the same class X k , the Gaussian Kernel Density of x can be estimated by:
where σ is the bandwidth parameter controlling the smoothness of the Gaussian estimation, z is the logits of input x, and |X k | is the number of samples in X k .
Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID): LID is a measurement to characterize the dimensional characteristics of adversarial subspaces in the vicinity of adversarial examples. Given an input sample x, the MLE estimator of LID makes use of its distances to the first n nearest neighbors:
where r i (x) is the Euclidean distance between x and its i-th nearest neighbor, i.e, r 1 (x) is the minimum distance while r n (x) is the maximum distance. LID is computed on each layer of the network producing a vector of LID scores for each sample.
Classification Tasks, Datasets and DNN Models
Here, we consider three highly successful applications of DNNs for medical image classification: 1) classifying diabetic retinopathy (a type of eye disease) from retinal fundoscopy (Gulshan et al., 2016b) ; 2) classifying pneumothorax (a type of lung disease) from chest-xrays (Wang et al., 2017; Rajpurkar et al., 2017) ; and 3) classifying melanoma (a type of skin cancer) from dermoscopic photographs (Esteva et al., 2017) . Here, we briefly introduce some general experimental settings with respect to the datasets and network architectures.
Datasets. We use publicly available benchmark datasets for all three classification tasks. For our model training and attacking experiments, we need two subsets of data for each dataset: 1) subset Train for pre-training the DNN model, and 2) subset Test for evaluating the DNN models and crafting adversarial attacks. In the detection experiments, we further split the Test data into two parts: 1) AdvTrain for training adversarial detectors, and 2) AdvTest for evaluating the adversarial detectors. The number of images we retrieved from the public datasets can be found in Table 1 . We follow the data collection process described in (Finlayson et al., 2019) . For the diabetic retinopathy (DR) classification task, we use the Kaggle dataset Fundoscopy (Kaggle, 2015), which consists of over 80,000 high-resolution retina images taken under a variety of imaging conditions where each image was labeled to five scales from 'No DR' to 'mid/moderate/severe/proliferative DR'. In accordance with (Gulshan et al., 2016b; Finlayson et al., 2019) , we aim to detect the referable (moderate or worse) diabetic retinopathy from the rest.
For the pneumothorax classification task, we use the ChestXray8 database, which comprises 108,948 frontal-view Xray images of eight different classes: 'atelectasis', 'cardiomegaly', 'effusion', 'infiltration', 'mass', 'nodule', 'normal', 'pneumonia' and 'pneumothorax' (Wang et al., 2017) . We randomly sample images from the two classes 'normal' and 'pneumothorax' to obtain our data. For the melanoma classification task, we retrieve melanoma related images of class 'benign' and class 'malignant' from the International Skin Imaging Collaboration database (ISIC, 2019) . Figure  2 shows two examples for each class of our datasets.
DNN Models. For all the three datasets, we use the ImageNet pretrained ResNet-50 (He et al., 2016) as the base network whose top layer is replaced by a new dense layer of 128 neurons, followed by a 2 neuron dense layer for classification. The networks are trained for 200 epochs using a stochastic gradient descent (SGD) optimizer with initial learning rate 0.001, momentum 0.9 and learning rate decay 10 −4 . All images are center-cropped to the size 224×224×3 and normalized to the range of [−1, 1]. Simple data augmentations including random rotations, width/height shift and horizontal flip are used. When the training is completed, the networks are fixed in subsequent adversarial experiments.
Understanding Adversarial Attacks on Medical Image DNNs
In this section, we investigate 4 different attacks against DNNs trained on three medical image datasets. We first describe the attack settings, then present the attack results with accompanying discussions and analyses.
Attack Settings
The attacks we consider are: 1) the single step attack FGSM, 2) the iterative attack BIM, 3) the strongest first-order attack PGD, and 4) the strongest optimization-based attack CW (L ∞ version). Note that all these attacks are bounded attacks according to a pre-defined maximum perturbation with respect to the L ∞ norm, i.e., the maximum perturbation on each input pixel is no greater than . All 4 types of attacks are applied on both the AdvTrain and AdvTest subsets of images, following the pipeline in Figure 3 . Given an image, the input gradient extractor feeds the image into the pre-trained DNN classifier to obtain the input gradients, based upon which the image is perturbed to minimize the network's prediction to the target class. The perturbation steps for BIM, PGD and CW are set to 40, 20 and 20 respectively, while the step size are set to /40, /10 and /10 accordingly. Here, the target classes for all attacks are set to the opposite class of the ground truth.
Attack Results
We focus on the difficulty of adversarial attack on medical images compared to that on natural images in ImageNet. The attack difficulty is measured by the least maximum perturbation required for most (e.g. > 99%) attacks to succeed. Specifically, we vary the maximum perturbation size from 0.2/255 to 5/255, and visualize the drop in model accuracy on the adversarial examples in Figure 4 . The numeric results with respect to maximum perturbation = 1.0/255 can be found in Table 2 .
As expected, model accuracy drops drastically when adversarial perturbation increases, similar to that on natural images (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) . Strong attacks including BIM, PGD and CW, only require a small maximum perturbation < 1.0/255 to generally succeed. This means attacking medical images is much easier than attacking natural images like those from CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, which often require a maximum perturbation of > 8.0/255 for targeted attacks to generally succeed (Madry et al., 2018b; Xie et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019a) . We next consider further why attacking medical images is much easier than attacking ImageNet images. At first sight it is surprising, since medical images have the same size as ImageNet images. 
Why are Medical Image DNN Models Easy to Attack?
In this part, we provide explanations to the above phenomenon from the following three perspectives: 1) the characteristics of medical image classification tasks; 2) the characteristics of medical images; and 3) the characteristics of DNN models used for medical imaging.
Medical Image Classification Task Viewpoint. Medical image classification generally involves only a few classes, for example, classifying a lesion as benign or malignant. Contrast this against the existence of hundreds or thousands of classes of natural images in a dataset such as ImageNet. Such a difference may significantly influence the difficulty for attacking: the fewer classes there are, the easier for a targeted attack to succeed. For example, attacking a 'cat' image into class 'plane' may be more difficult than attacking a no diabetic retinopathy image into a having diabetic retinopathy image. For a binary classifier, a targeted attack is as easy as untargeted attack, since making an input image "dislike" one class is equivalent to making it "like" the opposite class. Hence, due to this phenomenon, adversarial attacks on medical images may be generally easier than those on natural images.
Medical Image Viewpoint. We show the saliency map for several images from different classes, for both ImageNet and medical images in the middle row of Figure 5 . The saliency (or attention) map of an input image highlights the regions that cause the most change in the model output, based on the gradients of the classification loss with respect to the input (Simonyan et al., 2013) . We can observe that some medical images have significantly larger high attention regions. This may indicate that the rich biological textures in medical images sometimes distract the DNN model into paying extra attention to areas that are not necessarily related to the diagnosis. Small perturbations in these high attention regions can lead to significant changes in the model output. In other words, this characteristic of medical images increases their vulnerability to adversarial attacks. However, this argument only provides a partial answer to the question, as there is no doubt that some natural images can also have complex textures.
DNN Model Viewpoint.
We next show that the higher vulnerability of medical DNN models is largely caused by the use of overparameterized deep networks for simple medical image analysis tasks. The third row in Figure 5 illustrates the representations learned at an intermediate layer of . Surprisingly, we find that the deep representations of medical images are rather simple, compared to the complex shapes learned from natural images. This indicates that, on medical images, the DNN model is learning simple patterns out of a large attention area. However, learning simple patterns does not require complex deep networks. This motivates us to investigate whether the high vulnerability is caused by the use of overparameterized networks, by exploring the loss landscape around individual input samples. Following previous works for natural adversarial images (Tramèr et al., 2017; , we construct two adversarial directions g and g ⊥ , where g and g ⊥ are the input gradients extracted from the DNN classifiers and a set of separately trained surrogate models respectively. We then craft adversarial examples following x adv = x + 1 g + 2 g
⊥ .
More specifically, we gradually increase 1 and 2 from 0 to 8.0/255, and visualize the classification loss for each combination of 1 and 2 in Figure 6 . We observed that the loss landscapes around medical images are extremely sharp, compared to the flat landscapes around natural images. A direct consequence of sharp loss is high vulnerability to adversarial attacks, because small perturbations of an input sample are likely to cause a drastic increase in loss. A sharp loss is usually caused by the use of an over complex network on a simple classification task .
In summary, we have found that medical DNN models can be more vulnerable to adversarial attacks compared to natural image DNN models, and we argue this may be due to 3 reasons: 1) medical image DNNs that have only a few classes are generally easier to be attacked; 2) the complex biological textures of medical images may lead to more vulnerable regions; and most importantly, 3) state-of-the-art deep networks designed for large-scale natural image processing can be overparameterized for medical imaging tasks and result in high vulnerability to adversarial attacks.
Discussion
In deep learning based medical image analysis, it is a common practice to use state-of-the-art DNNs that were originally designed for complex large-scale natural image processing. However, these networks may be overparameterized for many of the medical imaging tasks. We would like to highlight to researchers in the field that, while these networks bring better prediction performance, they are more vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In conjunction with these DNNs, regularizations or training strategies that can smooth out the loss around input samples may be necessary for robust defenses against such attacks.
Understanding the Detection of Medical Image Attacks
In this section, we conduct various adversarial detection experiments using two state-of-the-art detection methods, i.e., KD (Feinman et al., 2017) and LID (Ma et al., 2018) . In addition, we also investigate the use of deep features (denoted by "DFeat") or quantized deep features (denoted by "QFeat") for adversarial detection.
Detection Settings
The DNN models used here are the same as those used in the above attack experiments (see Section 4). The detection pipeline is illustrated in Figure 7 . Based on the pretrained DNN models, we apply the four attacking methods (FGSM, BIM, PGD and CW) to generate adversarial examples for the correctly classified images from both the AdvTrain and AdvTest subsets. We then extract the features used for de- Figure 6 . The landscape (bottom row) of the loss around the input examples (top row). The x, y-axis of the loss landscape plots are 1 and 2, which are the sizes of perturbations added to two adversarial directions g and g ⊥ respectively: x adv = x + 1g + 2g ⊥ , where g is the adversarial direction (sign of the input gradients) and g ⊥ is the adversarial direction found from the surrogate models. The z-axis of the loss landscape is the classification loss. The use of overparameterized deep networks on medical images causes the loss landscapes around medical images extremely sharp, compared to that of natural images. tection, which include the deep features at the second-last dense layer of the network ("DFeat"/"QFeat"), the KD (kernel density estimated from the second-last layer deep features) features, and the LID (local intrinsic dimensionality estimated from the output at each layer of the network) features. All the parameters for KD/LID estimation are set as per their original papers. All detection features are extracted in mini-batches of size 100. The detection features are then normalized to [0, 1] . The detectors are trained on the detection features of the AdvTrain subset, and tested on the AdvTest subset. As suggested by (Feinman et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Ma et al., 2018) , we use a logistic regression classifier as the detector for KD and LID, the random forests classifier as the detector for the deep features, and the SVM classifier for quantized deep features. AUC (Area Under Curve) score is adopted as the metric for detection performance.
Detection Results
We report the detection AUC scores of the 5 types of detectors against the 4 types of attacking methods (white-box) across the three datasets in Table 3 . State-of-the-art detectors demonstrate very robust performance against these attacks. Especially the KD-based detectors, which achieve an AUC of above 99% against all attacks across all three datasets. However, on natural images, these state-of-the-art detectors often achieve less than 80% detection AUC against some of the tested attacks such as FGSM and BIM (Feinman et al., 2017; Ma et al., 2018) . This indicates that medical image adversarial examples are much easier to detect compared to natural image adversarial examples. Quite surprisingly, we find that the deep features (e.g. 'DFeat') alone can deliver very robust detection performance against all attacks. In particular, deep feature based detectors achieve an AUC score above 98% across all the testing scenarios. On the other hand, the detectors trained on quantized deep features (e.g. 'QFeat') also achieve good detection performance. This indicates that the deep features of adversarial examples (adversarial features) may be fundamentally different from that of normal examples (normal features).
Why are Adversarial Attacks on Medical Images Easy to Detect?
To better illustrate the difference between adversarial and normal features, we visualize the 2D embeddings of the deep features using t-SNE (Maaten & Hinton, 2008) . We observe in Figure 8 that adversarial features are almost linearly separable (after some linear transformations) from normal features. This is quite different from natural images, where deep features of adversarial examples are quite similar to that of normal examples, and deep feature based detectors can only provide limited robustness (Metzen et al., 2017; Li & Li, 2016; Feinman et al., 2017; Ma et al., 2018) . Similar to Figure 5 , we visualize the deep representation of normal and adversarial examples in Figure 9 . We find that there are no visual differences between adversarial and normal representations. In other words, adversarial perturbations only slightly change the deep representations. Considering the difference in deep representations between natural images and medical images ( Figure 5 ), this will lead to effects that are fundamentally different for natural versus medical images. As the deep representations of natural images activate a large area of the representation map, the adversarial representations that are slightly distorted by adversarial perturbations are not significant enough to be different from the normal representations. However, the deep representations of medical images are very simple and often cover a small region of the representation map. We believe this makes small representation distortions stand out as outliers.
To further understand why tiny changes in deep features can make a fundamental difference, we show the attention maps of both normal and adversarial examples in Figure 10 . We exploit the Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM) technique (Selvaraju et al., 2017) to find the critical regions in the input image that mostly activate the the network output. Grad-CAM uses the gradients of a target class, flowing into the final convolutional layer to produce a coarse localization map highlighting the important regions in the image for predicting the class. As demonstrated in Figure 10 , the attentions of the DNN models are heavily disrupted by adversarial perturbations. On natural images, the attentions are only shifted to less important regions which are still related to the target class. For example, in the 'cat' example, the attention is shifted from the ear to the face of the cat. However, on medical images, the attentions are shifted from the lesion to regions that are completely irrelevant to the diagnosis of the lesion. This explains why small perturbations in medical images can lead to deep features that are fundamentally different and easily separable from the normal features.
Discussion
According to our above analysis, medical image adversarial examples generated using attacking methods developed from natural images are not really "adversarial" from the pathological sense. Careful consideration should be made if using these adversarial examples to evaluate the performance of medical image DNN models. Our study also sheds some light on the future development of more effective attacks on medical images. Pathological image regions might be exploited to craft attacks that produce more misleading adversarial features that are indistinguishable from normal features. Such attacks might have a higher chance to fool both the DNN models and the detectors.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the problem of adversarial attacks on deep learning based medical image analysis. A series of experiments with 4 types of attack and detection methods were conducted on three benchmark medical image datasets. We found that adversarial attacks on medical images are much easier to craft due to the specific char- Figure 9 . The deep representations on normal images (first row) versus adversarial images (third row) learned by the ResNet-50 models at the 'res3a relu' layer. Figure 10 . The attention maps of the network on normal images (first row) versus adversarial images (third row). The attention maps are computed by the Grad-CAM technique (Selvaraju et al., 2017) .
acteristics of medical image classification, medical image data and DNN models. More surprisingly, we found that medical adversarial examples are also much easier to detect and a simple detector can achieve over 98% detection AUC against all tested attacks across the three datasets. This is because adversarial attacks tend to attack a widespread area outside the pathological regions, which results in deep features that are fundamentally different and easily separable from normal features. We believe these findings may be a useful basis to approach the design of secure medical deep learning systems.
